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“The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has become mainly about 
access, control and trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, 
cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is appealing and hard to resist in the 
context of lawlessness and the weakness of central authority.”  
“The role of the private sector in the exploitation of natural resources and the 
continuation of the war has been vital. (…) Companies trading minerals, which the 
Panel considered to be the ‘engine of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’, have prepared the field for illegal mining activities in the country” 
- United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
This study examines the supply chain of cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and as such put emphasis on the need for transnational resource control in utilising critical 
raw materials needed for low carbon technologies originating in conflict-prone states. In 
contrast to other studies, we analyse the extractive industry of a critical raw material 
originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo rather than focussing on the conflict 
minerals in the east of the country. First, we identify several barriers to utilization of 
critical raw materials in general. Additionally, we apply these barriers to the national and 
transnational trade dimensions that have affected the utilization of cobalt in recent years. 
Using single-case analysis, we find barriers in both the artisanal mining industry and the 
formal extraction industry. We find evidence of a clear absence of national and 
transnational regulated due diligence standards. Moreover, we demonstrate that 
transnational governance initiatives contribute to a solution in the cobalt mining industry 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, we demonstrate that our findings can be 
applied more general and that transnational resource control is a remedy to the challenges 
in utilising critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies originating in 
conflict-prone states.  
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1. Introduction 
In the upcoming decades, the composition of our energy mix will change significantly. 
When committing to (non-binding) Sustainable Development Goal 7 ‘Ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’, the share of renewable energy 
in the global energy mix will systematically grow, energy efficiency will double and 
universal access to affordable modern energy services will be ensured (United Nations, 
2015, p.1). Besides, in the Paris Agreement, it is agreed upon to keep a “global 
temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius” 
(United Nations, 2015, p.1).  
Kleijn et al. (2011) state that “almost 70% of the electricity is produced from fossil 
fuels and power generation accounts for over 40% of global CO2 emissions” (p.5640). 
Therefore, to commit to both Sustainable Development Goal 7 and the Paris Agreement, 
low-carbon technologies will play a fundamental role in the energy transition. Low-
carbon technologies require a wide range of different metals and materials and many of 
them are labelled as critical. The EU’s Strategic Energy Technology (SET) plan identifies 
four low-carbon technologies (wind, solar PV, electricity grid and biofuel) (European 
Commission, 2016, p.14). Besides, as identified in a policy paper by The Hague Centre 
for Strategic Studies, in addition to power generation, the energy transition will create an 
increasing demand in materials in the automotive sector (HCSS, 2017, p.2). Generally, 
besides the technologies listed by SET, plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles are assumed 
important low-carbon technologies as well.  
The increasing demand in critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies 
creates new challenges for both energy importing and energy exporting states. Among 
the energy exporting states, we can divide them into two groups: those that are currently 
net fossil fuel exporters and those that (can) mine Critical raw materials required for low-
carbon technologies. Focussing on the latter, some of these are challenging and conflict-
prone states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (HCSS, 2017, p.2). 
Economic welfare of the DRC is closely interlinked with the export of natural resources. 
This dependency “incentivizes suppliers to resort to trade-restrictive measures and makes 
them vulnerable to the impact of demand fluctuations” (idem, p.2).  
2 
 
Current regulatory approaches on responsible trading and mining of critical raw 
materials originating in conflict-prone states are insufficient. As opposed to regulatory 
approaches on responsible trading and mining of conflict minerals the current regulations 
on critical raw materials do not require tracing methods. Without focussing too much on 
the regulatory side of this debate, it is important to note the difference. Where the urgency 
of regulation on conflict minerals is undisputed in this research, the question that emerges 
is whether current regulatory approaches to utilization of critical raw materials are 
socially, economically, and politically optimised.  
For the past two decades, the struggle of both state and non-state actors to profit from 
war through illegal natural resource exploitation has been on economic and financial 
agendas. Many studies are conducted on the desire of these actors to access, exploit, and 
control natural resources in conflict-prone states (Tsabora, 2014, pp.109-110). However, 
most literature only describes these patterns. Regulating natural resource exploitation 
remains one of the greatest challenges facing conflict-prone states’ national and 
transnational legal systems. This thesis will try to fill the existing gap by applying 
transnational governance principles on the extractive industry of critical raw materials 
originating in conflict-prone states. Besides, most of the research conducted focusses on 
fossil fuels and conflict minerals. This research will show the shortcoming of current 
critical raw materials governance in conflict-prone states by making a theoretical 
argument from technical and economic perspective. 
Transnational companies are involved in exploiting the resources of a state and are a 
huge perpetuator of conflicts. Consequently, transnational resource governance initiatives 
rely heavily on cooperation with the private sector. Currently, our society and 
transnational companies rely heavily on the DRC for minerals in all kinds of electronics 
and low carbon technologies. Some scholars therefore even argue that transnational 
companies are the engine of the conflict in the DRC to ensure easy access to resources. 
This thesis, rather than condemning the private sector of fuelling the conflict, analyses 
whether transnational resource governance offers a sustainable solution to the utilisation 
of critical raw materials originating in conflict-prone states. The research question will 
be:  
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 ‘How does the material supply chain of cobalt from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo illustrate the need for transnational resource control in utilising critical raw 
materials needed for low-carbon technologies originating in conflict-prone states?’ 
To answer this research question we will analyse three sub questions:  
1. What barriers, if any, to utilization of critical raw materials currently exist? 
2. What national and transnational trade dimensions have affected the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s utilization of cobalt in recent years?  
3. In what ways could transnational governance initiatives contribute to a solution for 
the challenges to cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo as identified in 
the previous sub questions? 
The first sub question will address general barriers to utilization of critical raw 
materials needed for low-carbon technologies. Most barriers will be in line with general 
challenges of natural resources as repeatedly addressed by political scientists and 
economists. However, while focussing on critical raw materials in specific, we make 
some different observations and find additional barriers.  The second sub question serves 
to illustrate the developments and challenges in our case study, the DRC. In this twofold 
division between the national and transnational level of analysis we will find particular 
barriers for the artisanal and formal cobalt mining sector. The third sub question will 
analyse whether theoretical benefits of transnational resource control offers a solution to 
the existing barriers in the cobalt supply chain of the DRC.  
As so far, similar research has not been conducted in the academic world. While 
multiple non-governmental organizations and journalists increasingly stress the economic 
importance and supply risks of cobalt, the academics have not. One might have heard of 
studies on ‘blood rubber’, ‘blood diamonds’ and more recently ‘blood coltan’. Similar 
studies are not common related to cobalt mining. Surprisingly, as industry-led pilot 
schemes for ethical sourcing of cobalt have been launched and regulatory attempts have 
been made. We do note that more and more Universities have been given grands to 
conduct research on the understudied topic of cobalt supply risks (e.g. Leiden Universities 
involvement in the SCREEN project by the European Commission).  
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2. Social and scientific significance 
The broader scholarly debate around mineral mining in the developing world is 
disjointed. On the one hand, environmentalist, economists and dependency theorists focus 
on renewable energy development in empowering developing countries with renewable 
energy (e.g. Clay, 2002, Elliot, 2000, and Martinot, 2002). On the other hand, the more 
science-based scholars focus on renewable energy technologies development (e.g. 
Charters, 2001, and Stapleton, 2009). Interesting however, is that these fields barely 
combine forces and look at the political and economic implications of the resource 
extraction of minerals needed for renewable energy. 
 Renewable energy technologies face a number of barriers. According to the 
Renewable Energy Taskforce (2001) in Lauber (2016) “the barriers to renewable energy 
are not technological, but rather political, financial, educational and related 
infrastructure”. Volki (2005) in Lauber (2016) argues that the lack of enabling policies 
and regulatory frameworks in developing states is created by the liberalization and 
privatization of energy markets as imposed by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. Such reforms have been “primarily aimed at achieving economic and 
financial objectives, with little to no care for their environmental and social impacts” 
(p.89). This laisse-faire approach on renewable energy impacts states largely dependent 
on resource exports negatively.  
 States that depend substantially on rent of natural resources are called ‘rentier states’. 
According to Beblawi (1987), Adam Smith (1960) is credited with the distinction 
between rent and other sources of income. Ricardo (1962) in Beblawi affirms the 
distinction when he states that “mines, as well as land, generally pay rent to their owners 
and this rent is the effect and never the cause of the high value of their produce”. However, 
it was Mahdavi (1970) who came up with the term ‘rentier state’. He defined rentier states 
as “those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent.” 
He specifies that “external rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, 
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country” 
(p.428). Subsequently, Mahdavi argues that if a country is heavily dependent on natural 
resources for the financing of the government, this leads to a weak state. It is likely to 
weaken state capacity; however, it is just as likely to strengthen it.  
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This debate on the influence of mineral wealth in state capacity is central in the 
literature on the ‘resource curse theory’. The resource curse refers to the “failure of many 
resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for 
governments in these countries to respond to public welfare needs” (NRGI, 2015, p.1). 
The most important early contributors to the resource curse theory are Singer (1950) and 
Prebisch (1949). Classical economists believe that the price of primary commodities 
would increase relative to the price of manufactured commodities due to the law of 
diminishing returns. The combined work of Singer and Prebisch, later to be known as the 
Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis argues the opposite. They argue a long-term decline in terms-
of-trade of primary products relative to manufactured goods.  
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis generated both statistical criticism and support, 
keeping the scholarly debate hereon alive. Both statistical evidence against the hypothesis 
(e.g. Meier 1958, Haberler, 1961, and Findlay 1981) and statistical evidence in favour of 
the hypothesis (e.g. Spraos 1980, Sapsford 1985, and Yang 1988) can be given. Among 
others, Cuddlington (1992), concludes that the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis does not hold 
as universal fact. Considering the extensive debate on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, it 
is surprising that the term ‘resource curse’ and subsequent revival of debate only came 
around in 1998 in a book by Auty when he first introduced the ‘resource curse thesis’.  
The resource curse theory argues that natural resources have produced more misery 
than wealth for local populations (Mazalto, 2009, p.190). Although no consensus has 
been reached on the resource curse theory, the twelve states that are most dependent on 
mining are classified by the World Bank as heavily indebted poor states and have among 
the worst ratings on the Human Development Index (HIPC and EIR in Mazalto, 2009, 
p.190). The regulatory frameworks that were introduced in many of these states during 
the 1980s and 1990s have been widely called into question. In the last two decades, there 
have been calls for the mining codes of these states to be revised, contracts to be 
negotiated and measures to be introduced (Campbell, 2009, p.1). The external origin of 
the reform process responsible for new regulatory frameworks introduced into has had its 
implications for national governance (idem, pp.2-3). Global emphasis on corruption and 
lack of transparency within governments runs the danger of masking the fact that the 
situations are often facilitated and created by external actors. These situations of “lack of 
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transparency and of accountability appear to be particularly likely to occur in (…) the 
Democratic Republic of Congo” (Campbell, 2009, p.3).  
The NRGI (2015) identifies several other political and economic externalities of 
natural resources. First, states with relatively large natural resource wealth have a 
tendency toward authoritarian regimes.  Political scientists find that governments of 
resource-rich states are less likely to transition to democracy. Among others, Ulfelder 
(2007) has analysed that natural-resource wealth impedes transitions to democracy. 
Second, natural resources can provoke and sustain internal conflict. Although debatable, 
multiple case studies show the likelihood of civil war and international conflict of 
resource-rich countries. Among others, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have examined 
resource dimension of conflict. Third, natural resource wealth disproportionately affects 
women. Multiple gender-based challenges arise from natural resources, including but not 
limited to, medical diseases, violence against women and workforce inequality. Among 
others, Cummings (2003) has reflected on the gender issues in natural resource 
management.  Fourth, often only a small share of production value of the resources is 
taxed domestically. Governments are often limited to capture the economic benefits of 
natural resources. Van der Ploeg (2010) shows the limited benefits of natural resources 
by addressing the waste in capacity in several cases. Fifth, resource-rich states often face 
weaker institutional development as corruption is made easier for the elite. Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) have shown the link between natural resource possession and the level 
of corruption. Sixth, and probably no surprise, natural resource extraction causes 
environmental degradation. Besides, resource extraction often creates societal problems 
as well, whether it be economic, social or cultural. In a comparative case study by Vittorio 
(2011) the negative relation between resource dependency and human development are 
shown. Seventh, due to demand and price fluctuations governments tend to spend and 
borrow inefficiently. Arguably, this has contributed to the debt crises in some Latin 
American states in the 1980s. For example, Melina et al. (2015) have shown the 
inefficiency public investment and debt in resource rich developing economies. Finally, 
the ‘Dutch disease’, probably the most researched effect of the resource curse. It entails 
the theory that natural resource revenues can negatively impact other economic sectors. 
Ismail (2010) confirms the theory by his study on the implication of oil exports to the 
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manufacturing sector. In general, the resource curse theory, although still disputed, 
contributes to a clear understanding of possible causes and effects of natural resources. 
Not surprisingly, most academic works on the negative externalities of natural 
resources focus on fossil fuels, more specifically, oil (e.g. Watts, 2014, and Basedau and 
Lay, 2009) and natural gas (e.g. Weber, 2014). A likely explanation is that fossil fuels 
occupy a substantially larger share of the global energy mix at any date in history. 
However, raw materials have been of vital importance throughout history as well. Buijs 
et al. (2012) in Glöser et al. (2014) state that the topic of raw material supply security 
goes back to early human civilization. To illustrate, the fundamental importance of non-
fuel metals and minerals is shown by descriptions of periods in human history as the 
Copper Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age (NRC, 2008, p.19). In the twentieth 
century, the dependency and security of raw materials was vital in political conflicts as 
the two World Wars and the Cold War (Gandenberger et al., 2012, in Glöser et al., 2014). 
Following Germany’s invasion of Poland, Public Law 76-117 formally set stockpiling 
key materials to ensure adequate supplies in a national security emergency as a goal 
(Thomason et al, 1996, p.11). It was this same law that introduced the term ‘critical raw 
material’. In the 1970s and 1980s, due to high commodity prices, the 1973 and 1979 oil 
crises, the 1978 cobalt crisis and the Cold War awareness of the fear of raw materials 
shortages increased even further (Humphrey, 2010, Kesicki, 2010, Alonso et al., 2007, 
and Humphrey 2010 in Glöser 2014, p.36).  
In contemporary international relations the position of ‘critical raw materials’ is not 
that different from the previous century. Although some of the minerals changed, 
awareness of the fear of raw materials shortage is still high in the Western world. Among 
others, Rabe, Kostka and Smith Stegen (2016) examine the dependence of the European 
Union’s solar and wind industries on foreign supply of critical raw materials. They note 
that both governments and industry analysts have raised concerns over future pricing and 
availability of the materials needed for low-carbon technologies. The main parameters 
for critical raw materials are economic importance and supply risk. However, it is 
important to note that not all of these critical raw materials originate in conflict-prone 
states. Besides, many economically important and scarce resources from conflict-prone 
states are classified ‘conflict minerals’.  
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3. Theoretical background 
To answer the research question we first now clarify the concepts of transnational 
governance, state fragility, and the resource curse in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) from a theoretical perspective. As transnational governance is a broad concept, 
we will chronologically narrow the concept down to ‘transnational resource control’ as 
used in the research question. The criticality of critical raw materials is, among others, 
based on supply risk. It goes without saying that not all states having large disposals of 
critical raw materials face the same supply risks. Within the scope of this thesis we limit 
ourselves to the supply risk of critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies 
originating in conflict-prone states and have chosen state fragility as a measurement tool. 
Finally, we provide a theoretical background on the resource curse DRC. This will be a 
compact historical outline of the country’s political and natural resource wars. 
3.1 Transnational governance 
According to Bulkeley et al. (2014), the notion of ‘transnational’ has a rich history in the 
discipline of International Relations and plays an increasing larger role in multiple other 
fields. The term emerged in reaction to the realist notion of state hegemony as the central 
organizing concept. It can be traced back to scholars as Allison (1971) and Nye and 
Keohane (1971) when they attempted to theorise the impact of transnational relations on 
state behaviour. They called for a world politics paradigm, broadening the range of actors 
considered important. Governance, at the most general level refers to “issues of social 
coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule” (Bevir, 2011, in Bulkeley, 2014, pp. 
11-12). In scholarly debate, it is hard to tell when governance was moved into the 
transnational domain. Working with the notion that the transnational required crossing 
state borders and inclusion of non-state actors, involves a particular notion of how 
governance is organized in a world of states.  
Transnational governance is not about the disappearance of rules and order. Rather, 
on the increasing scope and breadth of regulatory and governance activities of all kinds. 
In today’s world, with a seemingly ever-increasing amount of regulations organizing and 
monitoring activities that connect with regulation represent important dimensions of 
contemporary governance (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005). An increasing share of this 
intense governance activity takes place between and across nations. Regulatory 
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boundaries do not necessarily coincide with national boundaries. According to the 
Encyclopedia of Governance, transnational governance is the “coordination of policy 
decision making or enforcement in a given issue area across national borders. 
Transnational governance typically involves non-state actor principals, as 
nongovernmental organizations, multinational firms, or international organizations 
respond to problems that cross national jurisdiction – often in the absence of meaningful 
involvement by governments” (Bevir, 2007, p.983). Indeed, states increasingly negotiate 
with non-state actors as non-profit associations, international organizations, standard 
setters and corporate actors (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2009, p.2). Interactions among 
these actors are complex and multidirectional. The allocation of responsibilities between 
them is flux and the borders between public and private spheres are increasingly fluid 
(idem, p.3). Transnational governance is not similar to supranationalism, multilateralism 
or transgovernmentalism. While it shares the cooperative and cross-border attributes of 
these models of interstate cooperation, “it is distinct in its formality, networked form and 
greater role for non-state actors” (Bevir, 2007, p.984).  
There can be a wide range of non-state actors involved in the process of transnational 
governance, and there is a wide range of issue areas. There are multiple studies and 
publications addressing the wide-ranging concept of transnational governance. Hale and 
Held (2011) in the Handbook of Transnational Governance map over fifty cases of 
transnational governance institutions. They find five different types of transnational 
governance mechanisms: transgovernmental networks (e.g. the G-20 in Kirton, 2011, 
p.55), arbitration bodies (e.g. World Bank Inspection Panel in Hale, 2011, p.148), 
multistakeholder initiatives (e.g. International Coral Reef Initiative in Dimitrov, 2011, 
p.182), voluntary regulations (e.g. Global Corporate Governance Principles in Baker, 
2011, p.273) and finance mechanisms (e.g. Carbon Offsets in Green, 2011, p.371). These 
types can be subdivided in multiple, often overlapping, issue areas. Examples given are 
economic integration, commerce, health, environment, security, development, human 
rights, general, and labour rights (Hale and Held, 2011, table 1.1, pp.13-14).  However, 
the samples in this much-credited work are all high-profile cases. While there are 
important insights, specific focus is needed when addressing a single-case study. Making 
any conclusions based on this wide array of samples is not doable; yet it does show the 
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impact of transnational governance. For the scope of this thesis, we will limit ourselves 
to transnational sustainable governance.  
Most of the studies and publications focused on transnational sustainable governance 
involve both state actors and non-state actors. Bulkeley et al. (2014) in Transnational 
Climate Change Governance illustrate the array of forms. They note carbon markets, 
certification standards, voluntary workplace schemes, emissions registries, carbon 
labelling, and urban planning codes as fields of transnational governance. They argue that 
these forms of transnational governance cut across traditional state-based jurisdictions 
and operate across public-private divides (p.1). Andonova and Levy (2010) in their article 
Franchising Global Governance focus on multi-stakeholder partnerships associated with 
the implementation of the sustainable development goals (p.19). Bukeley and Andonova 
(2014) note that although states are often central, transnational governance, by definition 
involves non-state or sub-state actors. They include businesses, individuals, religious 
groups, charities, NGOs, municipalities, courts, among others (p.5).  Cashore (2004) in 
Governing through Markets emphasizes the role of leading environmental groups in the 
Forest Stewardship Council. Jagers and Stripple (2003) go even further in Climate 
Governance Beyond the State and include media and epistemic communities in 
contemporary transnational governance (p.385). While multiple works can be found on 
any of the non-state or sub-state actors, Vatn (2018) emphasizes the major role of private 
actors and markets in transnational environmental governance (p.170).  
Pattberg (2012) argues that the increased role of the private sector is originating from 
the business risk of sustainable development. Businesses prepare for the negative impacts 
of climate change for their operations (p.613). In this context, an increasing number of 
private initiatives are seeking to change business behaviour, with transnational private 
governance as key instrument. Schouten and Glasbergen (2011) conduct empirical 
research on creating legitimacy of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. They 
conclude that non-state market driven governance arrangements can create legitimacy 
and were able to develop widely accepted rules of power and procedural regularity 
(p.1898). Wuisan, van Leeuwen and van Koppen (2011) analyse the Clean Shipping 
Project wherein this public-private partnership created supplementary regulations to 
uncouple growth in shipping activities from environmental harm (p.165). Fuchs and 
Clapp (2009) examine the ways transnational corporations exercise power over 
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governance of the global food system. They note that the transnational corporations play 
a key role in the establishment of rules and regulations by which they themselves are 
governed (p.1). As shown by the varying examples involving the private sector, even 
within transnational sustainable governance many political science and economic 
scholars address different topics. To narrow transnational governance down even further, 
and more in line with the topic of this thesis, we will now focus on transnational energy 
governance.  
There is a new wave of interest in what International Political Economy, seeking to 
deploy political economy analysis across different governance levels, can bring to the 
study of energy. Supra-national organisations, including Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative highlight the fragmentation of the 
international governance regime for energy (Lockwood, 2016, p.1). Besides, energy 
trade, finance and investment includes multiple actors looking at the markets, politics of 
energy subsidies, and clean energy trade as a source of tensions, including production 
subsidies, local content and counter-measures. For example, regarding Carbon Capture 
and Storage, Ramana (2016) observes that the oil and gas producers themselves have been 
at the forefront of new initiatives.  
According to Florine and Sovacool (2009) it is clear that the international energy 
markets suffer from lack of appropriate governance. Price signals are distorted by national 
government policies, both on the supply and demand side. National governments 
intervene in the sector to assure supplies, yet fail to regulate energy in key international 
aspects. Energy is governed by ad-hoc responses involving states or groups of states and 
a wide number of non-governmental actors. The non-governmental actors aim to fill some 
of the many gaps in global energy governance (p. 5239). To move to energy security and 
make the transition to low-carbon energy systems without extraordinary disruption and 
human suffering, many global governance mechanisms will be needed (p.5240).  
In an independent state, it is obvious that the government has the right to exercise 
political authority in relation to the exploitation of natural resources (Dam-de Jong, 2015, 
p.33) However, the rights and obligations attached to govern natural resource exploitation 
have increasingly been given a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension (idem, p.57). 
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To illustrate, Poocharoen and Sovacool (2012) analyse transnational governance for 
natural resources and energy in Asia. They note that inter-organizational networks 
comprised of multiple actors demonstrate effectiveness. For example, within Renewable 
Energy and Efficiency Partnership, the tripartite relationship between governments, non-
governmental organizations and the business sector strengthens the possibility of securing 
resources. There exists no single unified body of imposed rules governing energy control 
but there exists a set of parallel and overlapping institutions instead, often referred to as 
a ‘spaghetti bowl’ (Alter and Meunier, 2009, p.14). As such, transnational governance 
principles applied in the energy sector could create additional regulation to optimize 
transnational resource control. Hereby state and non-state actors should cooperate and 
establish transnational resource control mechanisms and guidelines. Together, they can 
regulate and legitimize the resource extraction industry just as we have seen with other 
transnational sustainable governance initiatives.  
3.2 State fragility  
The scholarly debate on ‘fragile states’, or the more punitive term ‘failed states’, has 
received increasing attention across the social sciences in recent years. This interest has 
been sparked by the urgency of understanding the factors behind political violence, civil 
war and terrorist organisations in less-developed countries (Menkhaus, 2004 in Di John, 
2010, p.10). Fearon and Laitin (2004) note that the main security threats and problems do 
not emerge from great power security competition, especially since the end of the Cold 
War, but from the consequences of political disorder, misrule, and humiliation in the third 
world (p.6). These threats have the character of ‘international public bads’ for the 
developed world and create a classic collective action problem (idem, p.13). Affective 
states have an incentive to share the costs to mitigate the ‘international public bads’ of 
state collapse and rogue regimes (idem, p.14). In this line of reasoning, contemporary 
foreign politics of Western states has often been shaped by potential threats of fragile or 
failed states (Di John, 2010, p.11).   
 Any discussion of state fragility starts with an understanding of different definitions 
of the state. The most widely applied definition, and the one used in international law, is 
the declarative theory of statehood in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The 
declarative theory of statehood defines a state when a political entity has a defined 
13 
 
territory, permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states (Montevideo Convention, 1933, article 1). However, throughout history, 
different International Relations theories have had varying definitions of a state. 
Definitions vary from having force as a foundational element, states as a set of 
institutions, and states in terms of political economy. Helman and Ratner (1993) were 
among the first to use the term ‘failed state’. Back then, they saw a new phenomenon 
where states became incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international 
community (Di John, 2010, p.13). State failure can occur in many dimensions, according 
to Rotberg (2002), “nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political 
goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy, and (…) the nation-state itself 
becomes illegitimate” (p.85).  
The OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations defines states as fragile “when state structures lack political will and/or 
capacity to provide basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to 
safeguard the security and human rights of their citizens” (OECD, 2007, p.2). Most of the 
states fitting this definition have been affected by violent conflict or are at risk of falling 
back into conflict. However, many states that are performing poorly in economic terms, 
such as “Tanzania, Ghana or Zambia, for example, have not experienced the similar 
breakdown of some other poor performers as Afghanistan, Somalia or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo” (Di John, 2010, p.11). It is clear that he problem is not just poor 
economic performance. Consequently, there exists no single definition of ‘fragile states’. 
The fragility is generally related to three different dimensions: effectiveness, authority, 
and legitimacy (UNDP, 2012, p.7). More broadly, state fragility is directly related to 
capacity deficits (Brinkerhoff, 2010, p.66). Brinkerhoff (2010) notes that besides the 
incapability of providing basic security, services, economic opportunities and gain 
legitimacy, fragile states have citizens who are “polarised in ethnic, religious, or class-
based groups, with histories of distrust, grievance and/or violent conflict” (p.66). 
Concluding, the larger the capacity deficits, the more a state moves towards failure, 
collapse, crisis and conflict.   
When addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Pierre Nkurunziza, the 
President of Burundi, noted that “the terminology ‘fragile states’ should only be used with 
caution (…) I strongly feel that it is not a neutral terminology. Apart from the emotional 
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implications, it has financial and political implications. Moreover, it gives us a bad image 
in the eyes of the investors we so badly need” (2009). It indeed can be argued that the 
capacity to shape the representation of reality is a soft power method. In this light, the 
concept of ‘fragile states’ can be seen as an attempt by other states to describe reality in 
the sake of their own foreign policy priorities (Grimm et al., 2014, pp. 197-198). It 
arguably is a Western dominated measurement tool that negatively affects the capacity, 
authority and legitimacy of the states labelled ‘fragile’. Within the scope of our research 
question, we will not look further into the causes and characteristics of state fragility. We 
rather focus on transnational resource governance in the context of state fragility. 
Therefore, within the chapter of case validation, we base our measurements of ‘conflict-
prone states’ on currently existing lists of ‘fragile states’ rather than developing our own.   
3.3 The resource curse in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is blessed with natural resources and cursed 
with the aftermath of resulting greed. As the resource curse theory argues, the high 
amount of natural resources has decimated its economic growth and political stability. 
Ever since the time of Imperialism under the Belgian King Leopold II in the 1870s, the 
DRC’s natural wealth has appeared to be a curse indeed (Carpenter, 2012, pp.2-3). After 
King Leopold II had personally colonized Congo (Free State), he began exploiting the 
land’s resources. Through forced labour and brutal exploitation of the population, King 
Leopold II generated rubber for his personal wealth. The demand for rubber particularly 
rose in the 1890s when bicycles and cars called for rubber tires.  
In the 1960s, Patrice Lumumba was elected in the first democratic national 
elections. The future looked promising as he aimed for a strong and independent future 
for the country. Only two months after he took power, a sub-committee of the US 
National Security Council authorised his assassination (Hochschild, 2001, p.287). His 
eventual successor was General Mubutu, who seized power through a coup d’état 
supported by the United States. He plundered the country, now renamed Zaire, on an even 
faster scale than King Leopold II did (idem, p.288). Eventually, in 1997, Laurent Kabila, 
who restored the name Congo, overthrew him. However, Mobutu’s decades of plundering 
had left the country without a functioning government. Hochschild (2001) sarcastically 
notes: “even if Kabila had been an administrative genius and a grass roots democrat – and 
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he was neither – it would have been a job of decades to build a coherent society out of 
the shambles he found” (p.288). In 2001, one of his own bodyguards assassinated Kabila 
in a failed coup and his son, Joseph, became the new President. Joseph Kabila negotiated 
accords and the Second Congo War, according to the IRC the deadliest war since World 
War II, formally ended in 2003 (SE, 2007, p.25). Nevertheless, violent conflict and the 
battle for resources continued ever since. 
 While King Leopold II was interested in the resources above ground, subsequent 
exploiters were more interested in the natural resources beneath ground (Zuckerman, 
2006, p.1). The inter-state wars in the DRC illustrate the political economy of warfare 
and economic explanations of violence. The DRC has experienced wars within wars as 
networks of conflict interact to produce different patterns of natural resource extractions 
(Carayannis, 2003, p.232). According to Carney in Kors (2010), the DRC is a nation of 
66 million people, being held hostage by no more than 6,000 rebels (p.1). The main reason 
these rebels have such firm control is because the people are poor and the rebels are well 
financed by the natural resource industry. 
All throughout history, wars have been fought for religion and resources. In the DRC 
it is the latter. By 1998, forces from eight different states were at war in the DRC as a 
result of ethnic tensions, power struggles and control over the natural resources (Kors, 
2010, p.1). In the DRC’s wars, characterised by illegal natural resource exploitation, an 
increasing number of different actors are involved (Tsabora, 2014, p.109). Major actors 
range from armed rebel groups, state officials, transnational corporations, regional 
networks, and business individuals. Without doubt, the armed rebels are most 
problematic. Their involvement in resource exploitation contravenes natural resource 
exploitation regimes and affects the DRC’s control over its natural resources (idem, 
p.110). For example, the cobalt mining zones in the north of Katanga feeds into arms 
trade and finances militias who control the mines (Mazalto, 2009, pp.216-217). Among 
others, the United Nations Security Council has expressed its concerns on the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in the DRC (e.g. UNSC 2001 and 2017). Growing 
international interest in spite, the resource curse in the DRC has not yet strengthened 
relevant international legal and institutional mechanism (Tsabora, 2014, p.127).   
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 According to Noury (2010), the untapped mineral wealth of the DRC is estimated 
$24 trillion, equivalent to the GDP of Europe and the United States combined, which 
makes the DRC potentially the richest state in the world (p.34). Resources like diamonds, 
gold, silver, tin, uranium, coltan and cobalt are among the most profitable natural 
resources it possesses (Kors, 2010, p.1). Nevertheless, the Congolese population has 
received little, if any, benefit hereof. Natural resource possession in spite, the GDP per 
capita is among the lowest globally. The International Monetary Fund (2018) ranks the 
DRC 186 out of 187, the World Bank (2018) ranks the DRC 173 out of 175 and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (2018) ranks the DRC 195 out of 197. 
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4. Methodology  
Before moving to the discussion wherein we analyse how the material supply chain of 
cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) illustrates the need for 
transnational resource control in utilising critical raw materials needed for low-carbon 
technologies originating in conflict-prone states we first need to elaborate on ‘how’ we 
will proceed with the discussion. In this chapter, we will first set out the research design 
where we describe the decisions made in this thesis. Hereafter we validate our case: the 
utilization of cobalt originating in the DRC.    
4.1 Research design  
The objective of this research thesis is to identify the barriers to utilization of critical raw 
materials from conflict-prone states and to find whether transnational governance 
initiatives could contribute to overcome these barriers. Critical raw materials are 
increasingly demanded for low-carbon technologies and their criticality is, among others, 
defined by the supply risks as a result of uneven geographical distribution. We have 
selected a vital critical raw material, cobalt, from a conflict-prone state, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. This single-case analysis will illustrate the need for transnational 
resource control in utilising critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies 
originating in conflict-prone states. We are aware that the research question is normative; 
we do not make policy recommendations. We rather describe how the world ‘should be’. 
By inductive reasoning, we will form an answer to this normative research question.  
 We apply an intensive approach where we focus on one specific instance to be 
studied in order to study the phenomenon in depth. We are therefore inclined to study one 
critical raw material in one conflict-prone state and analyse one possible solution. 
Evidently, based on our results, we will be able to draw interesting conclusions within 
this selected case. This intensive approach within one case may provide us with tentative 
ideas about the phenomenon, and therefore is an appropriate way to answer the broader 
research question. This is in line with the definition of Gerring (2007, p.65) when he 
noted, “a case study is an intensive study of a single case with an aim to generalise across 
a larger set of cases of the same general type”. However, Swanborn (2010, p.9) critically 
adds that a more appropriate expression would be that a “case study is the study of a 
phenomenon or a process as it develops within one case”. The difference between the two 
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authors is whether one sees the intention to generalise as a definitional property or as two 
different types of case studies. While cobalt extraction from the DRC might seem like a 
stand-alone case at first we expect it to be pars pro toto. As so far, comparable research 
projects have not been executed. The reason to believe it can be generalised to other 
contexts is based on historical examples of transnational governance solutions to resource 
extraction from conflict-prone states. These precedential examples will be analysed 
within this thesis.  
 Within this qualitative single-n case study, we will avoid doing research with human 
subjects at all and solely base our research on documentary evidence. As the research 
questions focusses on the macro-level of transnational resource governance, taking note 
of all the global stakeholders, it would be near to impossible to use interviews, 
questionnaires, or observe. As it is a qualitative literature based case study, it is not clear 
where one observation ends and another begins. The observations will flow seamlessly 
together. We are unable to tell precisely how much literature we need for a thick analysis; 
the number of observable documents remains undefined. We do so as the number of 
qualitative observations does not bear directly on the usefulness or trustfulness of the 
study (Gerring, 2017, p.161). It is the quality of the observations and how they are 
analysed, not the quantity, that is relevant in evaluating the need for transnational resource 
control in utilising critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies from 
conflict-prone states. This quality based literature review is useful as matrix observations 
cannot be collected and large-sample analysis is not deemed possible. In making our 
judgements on the evaluation of the available literature we follow considerations based 
on its relevance, proximity, authenticity, validity and diversity (idem, p.172).   
This thesis will use be conducted from a holistic approach. We will take into account 
that the behaviour of people and social phenomena are determined by a complex set of 
causes. Although less accepted in the social science research within this holistic approach 
we will base our explanation on ‘the pattern’ of the existing situation. The difference 
between explanans and explanandum hereby disappears (Swanborn, 2010, p.19). As a 
researcher always has to select, or looks at the world from a biased point of view, this 
will reduce the complexity of reality to a simplified model that seems to be adequate for 
our research. Our holistic approach originates from the situation that with our case study 
it is not yet possible to isolate the phenomenon under study from its environment. As the 
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topic is too understudied, we simply do not yet know which variables are relevant for the 
model and which variables are not. Based on available theoretical documents, rather than 
focussing on selected variables, we will make sure to structure our case study. 
  We are well aware of the vital importance of the historical, social, and cultural 
contexts of the theoretical framework. There exists fundamental disagreement between 
theorists, and opposing schools of thought. We have a clear understanding of how the 
schools of thought disagree and therefore deem it justifiable to keep the usage hereof to 
the bare minimum in our work. When theories, or schools of thought, are used in the 
theoretical framework of this thesis we will make sure to highlight the importance of 
opposing views and justify the selection we make. We will take an epistemological 
position described as interpretivist to better understand the social world through an 
examination of the interpretation of that world (Bryman, 2016, p.375). 
 The reproducibility of this research is based on its transparency and replicability. 
Although it is widely recognized that achieving transparency and replicability is harder 
to achieve in single-n case studies (Elman and Kapiszewski, 2014, in Gerring, 2017, 
p.209) we strive for openness about the research process and only use data that other 
researchers will be able to access. The sources of data used in this thesis are: academic 
books and articles, official documents deriving from institutions, official documents 
deriving from states, official documents deriving from private sources, official documents 
deriving from NGOs, mass-media outputs and websites. All three sub-questions, and 
subsequently the main research question, will be answered solely based on the sources 
just mentioned.  
As mentioned earlier, it would be near to impossible to conduct interviews, 
questionnaires or epistemological observations, as we cannot guarantee a perfectly 
reliable and valid focus group. Problems will occur regarding sample size, ethnography, 
social background, and language barriers, among others. Besides, as most reports 
acknowledge, data collection within the DRC is particularly challenging (Faber et al., 
2012, p.11).  
We are aware of the rationale and vulnerabilities of single-case designs for the sake 
of theory testing. However, we decided upon it as it represents a critical case in testing a 
well-formulated theory. Besides, it is an extreme case yet possibly representative for 
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similar future scenarios (Based on Yin, 2009, p.47-48.). We will try to overcome the 
vulnerabilities of single-case designs by using multiple methods and datasets to 
crosscheck whether multiple possible answers to the research question occur, the process 
of triangulation (Bryman, 2016, p.386). We assume that the biggest pitfall of our research 
will be the language barrier when researching domestic influences in the second sub 
question. However, up to now we have not came across French academic works that this 
research cannot be done without.  
4.2 Case validation 
For a case illustrating the need for transnational resource control in utilising critical raw 
materials needed for low-carbon technologies from conflict-prone states we had to look 
for a state that (1) has a great share of a critical raw material needed for low-carbon 
technologies and (2) is conflict-prone.  
4.2.1 Critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies 
A wide range of different metals and minerals are required for the development and large-
scale deployment of low-carbon technologies. To meet the ambitious goals as agreed 
upon in environmental negotiations, demand for these metals and minerals is expected to 
increase. This increase will include both metals of which the current world supply will be 
sufficient for centuries and critical raw materials. Based on research of the The Hague 
Centre for Strategic Studies (2017, p.2) we identify:  
Technology Metals Requirement 
Wind Dysprosium, Manganese, Neodymium, Molybdenum, 
Nickel, Chromium, Copper, Concrete 
Solar PV Tellurium, Indium, Tin, Silver, Gallium, Selenium, 
Cadmium, Copper, Lead, Silicon 
Electricity 
Grid 
Copper, Lead 
Biofuel Ruthenium, Cobalt 
Plug-in 
hybrids & 
electric 
vehicles 
Lithium and Cobalt (batteries), Neodymium, Terbium, 
Dysprosium and Lanthanum (Permanent Magnets) 
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  A closer look at the metals requirement of low-carbon technologies we note several 
metals needed that are included in the, among others, EU critical raw materials list 2017. 
The required metals needed for low-carbon technologies that are categorized as critical 
raw materials are: dysprosium, neodymium, indium, gallium, silicon, ruthenium, cobalt, 
terbium, and lanthanum (HCSS, 2017, p.2), these are highlighted in red. As the criticality 
of these critical raw materials is based on economic importance and supply risk, we will 
look at the geographical distribution and forecasted demand increase as well. Based on 
the 2017 list of Critical Raw Materials for the EU (EU Com, 2017) and the European 
Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials Raw Materials Scoreboard (2016) we note the 
following:  
 Geographical Distribution  
(States possessing ≥ 5% of a 
critical raw material) 
Projected 
demand 
increase 
2012-2030  
Indium China 57%, South Korea 
15%, Japan 10% 
+278% 
Gallium China 85%, Germany 7%, 
Kazakhstan 5% 
+200% 
Silicon  China 61%, Brazil 9%, 
Norway 7% 
+286% 
Cobalt Democratic Republic of 
Congo 64%, China 5%, 
Canada 5% 
+34900% 
Platinum Group Metals 
(including ruthenium) 
South Africa 83% +30669% 
Heavy Earth Elements 
(including dysprosium 
and terbium) 
China 95% +664% 
Light Earth Elements 
( including lanthanum) 
China 95% +2193% 
   
Analysing the global supply results, we find China as the largest global supplier of 
critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies. Several other states are 
important global suppliers of specific materials. As single largest supplier of a specific 
material, we note the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa. We find the 
highest projected demand increase for cobalt, followed by Platinum Group Metals 
(including ruthenium).    
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4.2.2 Conflict-prone states 
The terminologies of ‘fragile state’ and ‘conflict-prone state’ are often fluid. We do 
understand that not every fragile state will develop into a state of conflict. However, we 
believe that the presence of conflict has major implications on the resource governance 
of that state. Collier et al., (2003) note in Brinkerhoff (2010) that states which have 
experienced violent conflict, which is often the case with low-ranking fragile states, have 
a 40 per cent risk of renewed violence within 5 years (p.66). Within this chapter, we will 
analyse several rankings and find that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can be 
labelled as conflict-prone and China and South Africa cannot.  
The Fragile States Index, an annual report by Fund for Peace and the magazine 
Foreign Policy assesses states’ vulnerability to conflict or collapse. In the 2018 Index the 
DRC occupies the 6th place, China the 89th place, and South Africa the 85th place. The 
World Bank’s Group Harmonized List of Fragile Situations 2018 (previously the Low 
Income Countries Under Stress List and the Fragile States List) includes the DRC and 
estimates that neither China nor South Africa is having fragile situations. In the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), seen as a tool ranking poor 
governance, the DRC is ranked an IDA-eligible state where China and South Africa are 
not. The Worldwide Governance Indicators, again by the World Bank, rank the DRC in 
the global bottom 10 within all indicators, namely: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. Both China and South Africa perform significantly better on all indicators. 
As discussed in the theoretical background of this thesis, these rankings face criticism 
by the states ranked in the bottom. In general, institutions as the World Bank are accused 
to be biased and Western dominated. However, even the DRC itself acknowledges itself 
as a fragile state with its voluntary membership to the G7+, an intergovernmental 
organisation bringing together states that are either facing active conflict or have recent 
experience of conflict and fragility. Neither South Africa nor China are part of this 
organisation.   
We conclude that cobalt extraction from the DRC is a valid case illustrating the need 
for transnational resource control in utilising critical raw materials needed for low-carbon 
technologies form conflict- prone states. Based on the geographical distribution of the 
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critical raw materials needed for low-carbon technologies the DRC, China and South 
Africa were possible cases for our research. However, taking note of the sharp projected 
increase in demand of cobalt and the ranking of the DRC on all the major indicator lists 
we believe this is the most striking case study for our research.  
The DRC is not unique in this matter; Gobrecht (2011) compares cobalt mines that 
fund warfare and enslavement of local communities with the diamond mining in “Angola, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Western D.R. Congo, the Republic of Congo, and 
Zimbabwe” (p.415). Besides, we face similar, but less, problems in, for example, Rwanda 
with 31 per cent of global tantalum supply and South Africa with 85 per cent of Iridium 
(European Commission, 2017, p.1). 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 What barriers, if any, to utilization of critical raw materials currently exist? 
In many ways, the extractive industry of critical raw materials carries the same 
geopolitical and environmental barriers as fossil fuels. Raising prices of metals, and 
supply distortions for some, have led to their criticality (Vidal et al., 2013, p.895). Wind 
turbines, solar panels, electricity grids, bioenergy, electric vehicles, smartphones; critical 
raw materials are used in most technologies essential for the energy and digital transition 
in today’s world. The critical raw materials often have unique chemical, physical and 
electromagnetic features, which make them costly and of increasing value. Given the 
strategic importance of these materials for new technologies, states and private industry 
actors are striving for secure, sustainable and affordable supply (EU Com, 2017, p.2). 
The economic importance and comparatively high risk of supply disruption are of 
growing concern to many stakeholders globally. Lack of mining infrastructures coupled 
with a low number of producing countries amplifies these risks (SCREEN, 2018, p.1). 
According to Bleischwitz, Dittrich and Pierdicca (2012) “many international 
organizations and bodies, national governments, and private sector organizations” seek 
to address the situation “in particular via transparency, certification and accountability 
along the material supply chain” (p.19).   
There exists a strong nexus between critical raw material mining and technological 
development. The materials are vital to meet the deployment goals of low-carbon energy 
technologies. Among others, the Directorate General Joint Research Centre has found 
that new (low-carbon energy) technologies are at risk due to potential bottlenecks in the 
supply chain of several critical raw materials. They find high-risk supply chains in the 
lighting sector, wind energy and with electric vehicles (p.6). The importance of raw 
materials is nothing new. However, some materials are more critical than others are. 
Several frameworks on critical raw materials and the underlying criticality methodology 
are thereby key instruments. In most methodology, the criticality of the materials is 
determined by their economic importance and supply risks.  
The criticality, as assessed in terms of economic importance and supply risk is 
heavily influenced by increased demand and limited supply. Global population growth, 
economic growth, technological development, urbanization and government policies 
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have been the drivers of the increased global demand for minerals (UNU-Merit, 2016, 
p.1). Most significantly, however, is the transition to a low-carbon economy as agreed 
upon in environmental negotiations. Energy production is responsible for two-thirds of 
total greenhouse-gas emissions worldwide (IEA, 2015, in JRC, 2016, p.8). Therefore, the 
energy sector has a crucial role in addressing climate goals through renewable energy. 
Technological, financial, market and policy challenges of the large-scale deployment of 
low-carbon energy technologies will lead to a significantly increased demand for critical 
raw materials. Recent years have seen a high increase in the amount of minerals extracted 
and used. Besides, we notice a transition from the dominance of renewable biomass 
towards mineral materials (Krausmann, 2009, p.15). Together with a significant growth 
in the number of materials used in single products (Greenfield, 2013, p.1) global demand 
for critical raw materials will continue to rise. The (future) supply of the critical raw 
materials is limited or has a high risk. Among others, bottlenecks in the supply chain, 
difficulties with bulk transport, limited feasibility of extraction, low refining efficiency, 
and factors affect the supply (HCSS, 2017, p.3). Additionally, many of the critical raw 
materials are by-products of major minerals, which contributes to the scarcity. There is a 
difference between depletion and scarcity. Although physical depletion of the minerals is 
unlikely, utilising the resources is problematic. Taken together, the imbalance between 
increased demand and tighter supply has resulted in growing concerns about the 
availability of these methods and the impact of their supply shortages (UNU-Merit, 2016, 
p.1). Both resource-rich and resource-poor states have to take an active role in 
implementing mineral policy strategies to overcome resulting difficulties of the rising 
imbalance (Bartekova and Kemp, 2016, p.1).  
The supply scarcity and rising concerns on supply distortions are further accelerated 
by the uneven geographical distribution of critical raw materials.  China, Russia, Australia 
and multiple states in Africa and South America are leading suppliers of critical raw 
materials globally. Although there is little evidence of a physical shortage of the materials 
in the short-term, the imbalance has caused fundamental changes in the world market and 
has become a political issue and threat. The fact that many critical raw materials are 
located in parts of the world that do not have a market-based system or are politically or 
economically unstable poses particular risks (Prometia, 2018, p.1). Where some states are 
labelled challenging, others are conflict states. Not surprisingly, the uneven geographical 
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distribution of critical raw materials is a case for conflict over the control of minerals in 
fragile states (Bleischwitz, 2012, p.19).  
Paradoxically, the rising demand for critical raw materials is boosted further by the 
energy needed for extraction and processing of mineral resources. Initially, the energy 
needed will come from fossil fuels. Currently, 10 per cent of world energy consumption 
is used for extraction and processing of mineral resources (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2013, in Vidal et al., 2013, p.895). This percentage will rise as poorer 
and more remote deposits of minerals are tapped.  Eventually, in line with the global 
climate ambitions, renewable energy is likely to come to the force. According to Vidal et 
al. (2013) this will correspondent to a 5 to 18 per cent annual increase in the global 
production of the particular metals for the next 40 years increasing the demand for critical 
raw materials even further (p.895).  
 The environmental and social impact of critical raw material extraction creates 
negative barriers to utilisation as well. Current debate focusses on illicit and unethical 
mining of many critical raw materials. The high value of the minerals stands in sharp 
contrast with the environmental and social degradation, especially the critical raw 
materials mined artisanal. Child labour, forced labour, violence against women and other 
human rights violations create communal friction and raising customer awareness.  
Where most barriers to the utilisation of critical raw materials seem measurable and 
physical at first sight, a lack of data collection limits the measurability. Currently there 
exists no reliable geological data on metal and mineral deposits, particularly throughout 
Africa. Governments in conflict-prone states, which host a sizeable percentage of 
unidentified mineral deposits, are reluctant to cooperate as the costs of data collection are 
high (HCSS, 2017, p.3). Besides, illicit trade enters the market and is reflected in 
statistics. Taking a closer look at the available data Bleischwitz (2012) notes that 
neighbouring states declare exports of critical raw materials that are only partially covered 
by adding up domestic production and imports. Besides, he notes, that importing Western 
states, declare imports that are not equal to the exports of the critical raw material 
exporting state (p.9).  
We have found several general barriers to utilization of critical raw materials. First, 
there exists an imbalance between (future) demand and supply. Second, the uneven 
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geographical distribution of the critical raw materials. Third, the paradox of increased 
energy consumption as a result of mining. Fourth, the environmental and social impact in 
the states where the minerals are mined. Finally, the lack of data and the problems of data 
collection.  
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5.2 What national and transnational trade dimensions have affected the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s utilization of cobalt in recent years?  
It is an understatement that the Democratic Republic of Congo is both warn-torn and rich 
of minerals. The combination of these two aspects highly influences the struggle of the 
government to seize economic, political and military power in the country. Gobrecht 
(2011) notes that ever since the Second Congo War, a “range of armed groups” controls 
“mines and the local populations who service them” (p.414). Although the Second Congo 
War officially ended with the Pretoria Accord in 2002, the armed groups are still present 
and the conflict is on-going. As stated in a report by Global Witness the militarisation of 
the mining activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) prolongs the conflict. 
Although the copper cobalt mines officially do not fall within the conflict area, and 
therefore not fall under the conflict mineral regulations, the “unregulated nature of the 
mining sector (…) combined with the breakdown of law and order and the devastation 
caused by the war, has meant that these groups have unrestricted access to these minerals 
and have been able to establish lucrative trading networks (2009, p.4).  The economic 
importance of cobalt, in combination with the political situation in the DRC, makes cobalt 
a strategically sensitive resource.  
According to the US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries 2016 
Report, the DRC is the “largest producer of cobalt globally, accounting for 51 per cent of 
global production” and has some of “the highest quality copper reserves globally” where 
cobalt originates from (2016, pp.53-55). A year later, in 2017, the European Commission 
even estimates that Congo has 64 per cent of global cobalt supply (2017, p.1).   
Problems arise when focussing on mineral extraction in the DRC in light of the 
current conflict. According to Polgreen in Gobrecht “armed groups, rebels, and the 
national military alike, control over 50 per cent of the mining sites in eastern DRC” (2011, 
p.414). However, the mining locations of cobalt are not located in eastern DRC. Most 
scholars and regulations focus on conflict minerals. Conflict mineral regulations require 
“diligence to determine whether the products they (private sector red.) manufacture, or 
the components of the products they manufacture, contain tantalum, tin, tungsten, and 
(or) gold (3TG) minerals, and, if so, to determine whether the minerals were sourced from 
Congo (Kinshasa) and (or) its bordering countries” (U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. 
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Geological Survey, 2016, p.73). Gobrecht (2011) notes, “the minerals that fund armed 
groups in the DRC are some of the most vital minerals in the production of consumer 
electronics” (p.415).  Some scholars argue that cobalt should be added to the conflict-
minerals list as cobalt is used in numerous commercial, industrial, and military 
applications as well (Resolve, p.8). When comparing a map of the DRC adapted from UN 
Peacekeeping Operations (Map 1.1) and a map of the DRC’s mineral resources (Map 1.2) 
we indeed observe that none of the copper cobalt mining sites are located in conflict area. 
In this thesis we will therefore not make a case to add cobalt from the DRC to existing 
conflict mineral regulations, we rather compare with the current conflict minerals in the 
DRC.  
  Map 1.1 – adapted from UN Peacekeeping Operations (Drum, 2017, p.1) 
 
Map 1.2 – DRC’s mineral resources (Le Monde diplomatique, 2006, p.1)
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 In the past decade, the United States, the European Union and the People’s Republic 
of China, among others, individually passed conflict-mineral laws to “stem the flow of 
money to Congo’s murderous militias, focussing on the artisanal mining of four minerals” 
(Frankel, 2016, p.1). The paradox, however, is that the DRC is a minor supplier of the 
four designated conflict minerals, yet the world depends on the DRC for cobalt. In spite, 
the same diligence as required with conflict minerals is not mandatory for cobalt (idem, 
p.1). Some analysts suggest that the dependency of the world on the DRC for cobalt is 
the main reason cobalt has been left out of the regulations.  
 Taking a closer look at the conflict mineral regulations Gobrecht emphasizes that the 
due diligence paradigms “do not involve stopping of sourcing of minerals from the DRC, 
rather involve tracing where the minerals come from in the DRC and only accepting such 
minerals that did not go to funding armed groups in control of the mines” (2014, p.522). 
However, a 2009 report Faced with a Gun, what can you do? – War and Militarisation 
of Mining in Eastern Congo, by Global Witness, states that “by the time these minerals 
reach their ultimate destinations – the international markets in Europe, Asia, North 
America and elsewhere – their origin and the suffering caused by this trade, has long been 
forgotten” (p.4). Eichstaedt (2016), confirms that “UN experts had been reporting the 
same information for nearly a decade, and the Global Witness report reinforced their 
findings” (p.108). We, however, intend to look at the barriers affecting the utilization of 
cobalt and will not go further into conflict minerals originating in the DRC.  
 The general barriers to the utilization of critical raw materials as found in the first 
sub question all apply to cobalt extraction from the DRC as well. We note a strong 
imbalance between current and future demand and supply. We find uneven geographical 
distribution and the world is dependent on the DRC for its global cobalt demand. As with 
all minerals, increasing copper cobalt mining will additionally require extra energy 
demand, having additional negative externalities. Next, we find that the environmental 
and social impact of cobalt mining is severe. Finally, we face a lack of data collection, as 
the DRC has not been reporting trade figures to international organizations since 1987 
(e.g. UN Comtrade; Bleischwitz et al., 2012, p.9). Therefore, our data will be either 
limited or qualitative rather than statistical in nature.  
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 The cobalt mining industry in the DRC has two parallel sectors: “the formal sector, 
where foreign and multinational companies use industrial mining methods and the 
informal or artisanal sector” where individuals dig for minerals independently in an 
unregulated environment (Global Witness, 2006, p.4). These artisanal miners mine by 
hand and include children, forced labour and other human rights abuses. The cobalt mined 
by the artisanal miners enters the supply chain of transnational companies as well. 
However, to separate this mixed supply, we will address the informal or artisanal cobalt 
mining sector under subchapter 5.2.1 focussing on the national trade dimension and 
include the formal cobalt mining sector under subchapter 5.2.2 focussing on the 
transnational trade dimension.  
5.2.1 National trade dimensions  
After the largest state owned mining company collapsed in the 1990s artisanal mining 
became a source of living for many people. During the Second Congo War, President 
Kabila even encouraged people to dig for themselves, as the government was unable to 
revive the industry (Amnesty International, 2016, p.5). Indeed, in 1999, during the 
Second Congo War, the mining liberalization and subsequent policy changes of the early 
2000s ended the government’s effective monopoly on mineral extraction (Faber et al., 
2017, p.11). As the industrial production had collapsed, the miners started exploiting the 
cobalt themselves. When a new mining code was published in 2002, as an attempt to 
attract foreign investment, artisanal mining was limited to authorized zones where 
industrial mining is not viable. Forced evictions led to violent protests and around 
100,000 artisanal miners represented new political instability to the transition government 
(Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.1). Consequently, most of these artisanal miners ended up 
working in unauthorized and unregulated areas. According to the government’s estimates, 
20 per cent hereof comes from artisanal miners in the southern part of the country 
(Amnesty International, 2016, p.4). However, findings by Tsurukawa et al. (2011, p.1) 
argue this percentage to be between 60 and 90 per cent. Accordingly, the contribution of 
the sector to national economy ranged between 149 and 324 million USD in 2010 (idem, 
p.2).  There exists a wide range of different ways for artisanal miners to mine cobalt. In 
some places, it includes digging tunnels, in other places they dig cobalt from by-products 
of rocks left over from industrial mining. Generally, men are involved in the first and 
women and children in the latter (Idem, p.5).  
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The cobalt mining pits can be dangerous and artisanal production has many negative 
externalities. The Democratic Republic of Congo Mining Code (2002) and Regulations 
(2003) provide no guidance for artisanal miners on safety equipment and handle 
substances that pose danger to their health (Amnesty International, 2016, p.5). Sauni et 
al., (2010) find negative health consequences of working with cobalt. Based on case 
reports they find that cobalt exposure leads to negative health consequences including 
asthma, allergic contact dermatis and hard metal disease (p.301). Among others Linna et 
al., (2003) and van Roto (1980) find similar results Although official data is widely 
unavailable on the number of deaths (Amnesty International, 2016, p.6), being exposed 
to landslide hazard, annual death rates reach 0,4 to 0,5 per cent of the workforce in some 
areas (Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.2). Poor sanitation, prostitution, higher prevalence of 
HIV, high temperatures, heavy lifting and long working hours pose additional health 
risks.  
Additionally to health consequences, UNICEF estimated in 2014 that around 40,000 
children work in the mines in southern DRC, of which many in the cobalt mines (Amnesty 
International, 2016, p.6). Tsurukawa et al. (2011) found similar numbers with around 
19,000 to 30,000 children under the age of 15 and 9,000 to 15,000 children between age 
15 and 17 in the artisanal cobalt mining sector. By interviewing some of these children, 
Amnesty International found that they had been beaten by security guards when mining 
outside of the authorized zones and being forced to hand money to these guards (2011, 
p.6).  Nunn (2008) and Dell (2010) in Faber et al. (2017, p.10) find that, in general, 
coercive forms of labour can have adverse long-term consequences both for the children 
themselves and societies as a whole. Lowes and Montero (2017) confirm that it negatively 
has affected the DRC as well (p.1).  
Not only are the artisanal miners affected, the environment of the mine-related 
activities is affected as well. Lubaba Knulu Banza et al. (2009) and Pourret (2016) find 
higher concentrations of cobalt on soil and population living within 10km of the African 
copper cobalt belt (p.745).  Besides, artisanal miners, in spite of legal framework that 
imposes consultation and compensation for negative impacts, mostly ignore the 
indigenous rights (Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.6). Multiple studies find negative impacts on 
the resources of indigenous people as a result of extractive industries. Among others 
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Gildenhuys (2005) and Temper (2013) note negative impacts on agricultural land, 
drinking water, wood stock, infrastructure and purchasing power for indigenous people.  
Multilateral institutions including the International Labour Organization, UNICEF 
and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have reported extensively 
on the dangers on artisanal mining and child labour within the copper cobalt mining sector 
in the DRC (Faber et al., 2017, p.11). Despite the negative aspects, many miners find 
satisfaction due to the rapid cash turn-over and relatively higher income. Artisanal mining 
hereby plays a crucial role in the socio-economic landscape of the copper cobalt belt. It 
is the labour intensiveness, together with the fact that unskilled labourers without 
significant investment, that artisanal cobalt mining is a way of living for many households 
in Katanga (Tsurukawa, 2011, p.3). Besides, Faber et al. (2017) find that empirical 
evidence suggests that banning child labour, or cutting demand from sectors with child 
labour, has detrimental effects on the households and children. Basu and Van (1998) 
agree and argue that it can worsen the welfare of the labour households (p.425). Studies 
by Saez (2012) in Faber et al. (2017) find that the de facto mining embargo in Eastern 
DRC following the passage of the Dodd-Frank act confirm these unintended 
consequences (p.11).  
5.2.2 Transnational trade dimensions  
Artisanal cobalt miners have little knowledge of world commodity price and are paid 
insufficiently for their labour (Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.2). Besides, most of the minerals 
containing cobalt mined artisanal are exported raw. Consequently, the DRC could obtain 
higher prices if it processed the minerals before exporting them. It provides considerable 
economic gain for the processing destinations but little benefit for the DRC (Global 
Witness, 2006, p.5).  
Both artisanal miners and foreign and multinational companies face the challenges 
of corruption. Corruption remains widespread; the DRC ranks 161 out of 180 countries 
in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 (Transparency International, 2018). As many 
state agents and union representatives are engaged in the mining sector, traders have 
constituted networks of political protection (Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.3). Consequently, 
a significant amount of the cobalt is mined informally and exported illicitly (Global 
Witness, 2006, p.4) Traceability becomes close to impossible as even the state agents and 
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union representatives label illegal ores as ores originating from legal artisanal mining 
zones (Tsurukawa et al., 2011, p.2).  
To overcome these barriers foreign and multinational companies increasingly resort 
to the formal mining industry of the DRC. Just as we have seen with other international 
initiatives that limit the flow of funding from conflict minerals to armed groups, this leads 
to the loss of livelihoods for millions of small-scale miners (Kelly, 2014, p.100). Donors 
and companies are recommended to develop alternative livelihood schemes, taking 
account of traditional economic activities and labour migration (IGF, 2017, p.40). 
However, Perks (2011) argues that artisanal miners in the DRC would face barriers even 
if these schemes would be established. He notes: “these barriers are of both a technical 
livelihood nature and more profound structural nature (relating debt, predation and 
security), influenced by past economic development and subsequent urban migration, 
land access and the established trade and power relationships in the country’s mineral-
rich areas” (p.1117). Nevertheless, we observe an increase in the industrial mining sector 
of the DRC. Recently, Apple Inc. declared it would not let cobalt from artisanal miners 
from the DRC into its supply chain unless it could verify that “appropriate protections” 
are assured (Farchy and Gurman, 2018, p.1).  
The industrial mining sector is split between upstream and downstream companies. 
Upstream companies include mining companies, traders and smelters/refineries. 
Downstream companies include component producers, contract manufacturers and 
electronic and car companies. The electronics and car companies in particular recently 
tried to secure cobalt supply for their commodities. Apple Inc., driven by industry fears 
of a shortage driven by the electric vehicle boom, was the first company to agree on long-
term supplies of cobalt directly from miners (Farchy and Gurman, 2018, p.1). Companies 
including BMW AG (Sanderson, 2018, p.1), Volkswagen Ag (Reiter and Rauwald, 2018, 
p.1) and Samsung SDI Co. (Clowes and Kim, 2018, p.1) are striving for similar multiyear 
cobalt contracts. These contracts are linked to a pricing index but capped at a certain level.  
 Upstream companies face problems in the utilization of cobalt as well. This month 
(June 2018 red.), the DRC recently passed new legislation. Despite lobbying by foreign 
multinational mining companies as Glencore Plc., Randgold Resources Ltd. and China 
Molybdenum, the new mining law voids existing agreements and increases the costs of 
35 
 
the mining companies. The DRC has declared cobalt a ‘strategic’ mineral that will earn 
the country higher royalties (Reuters, 2018, p.1). The miners are now liable to pay a 50 
percent tax on super profits and up to 10 per cent royalty on cobalt production. Besides, 
the code removes a clause protecting the industrial miners from changes to the fiscal and 
customs regime (Wilson, 2018, p.1). According to Wilson (2018), the industrial miners 
now have little options left. They could try to cut individual deals to gain exemptions, 
they could challenge at international arbitration or they could stop all production. All 
these options will harm the global cobalt supply chain significantly (p.1). The mining 
companies warn the DRC it may lose more than 3 billion USD of income from existing 
cobalt projects since mining companies will take legal action to “pursue the application 
of their right” under the former mining code and the government will not be able to collect 
the revenues expected (Clowes, 2018, p.1) 
 Critics put forward that the new mining code might be established to serve President 
Kabila’s interests. Wilson (2018) states that while the constitution bars Kabila from 
running a third term, the President himself has refused to rule himself out as a candidate. 
His campaign to get more revenue out of mining companies is popular among voters. 
Besides, the President himself is heavily involved in the mining industry. In All the 
President’s Wealth: The Kabila Family Business by the Congo Research Group (2017) 
Kabila’s personal interest in the mining sector is shown. Among others, the Ministry of 
Mines has granted a company by his sister more cobalt mining permits than allowed under 
the country’s mining code (p.2).  
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5.3 In what ways could transnational governance initiatives contribute to a solution 
for the challenges to cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo as 
identified in the previous sub questions? 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the reforms of the early 2000s have led to 
the creation of a new legal framework and new standards to achieve development 
objectives in the extractive industries. However, the political and socioeconomic 
considerations are denied herein. We still find a large gap between policies, laws and 
resolutions that have been adopted and the unregulated nature of the mining sector 
(Mazalto, 2009, p.202). As identified, the weakness in the capacity of the DRC to control 
the cobalt mining areas make it almost impossible to implement effective national mining 
policies, under the control of national institutions. Besides, the current Mining Code and 
Regulations contain limited guidance on health, safety and labour rights of the artisanal 
miners.  
As any state, the DRC is a state party to multiple international and regional treaties, 
hereby being bound to protect the rights of the Congolese. These treaties include the 
“International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, ILO Minimum Age 
Convention and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights” (Amnesty 
International, 2016, p.39). Currently, the government of the DRC is failing to meet its 
obligations in any of these. UN bodies, ILO expert bodies and NGOs alike have been 
openly criticising the state government. Arguably, the government is, whether 
institutionally or materially, incapable of complying with international law. With only 20 
inspectors employed for the entire mining region in southern DRC, the state falls short in 
inspection of the mining sites (Amnesty International, 2016, p.7) It is this same mining 
region in southern DRC, the province of Katanga, that has the most important mining 
potential (Baracyetse, 1999, in Mazalto, 2009, p.213). Currently, there are more than 150 
mining companies operating in this area.  
At present, the majority of the cobalt mining sites in southern DRC are exploited 
without any control over the labour conditions or job safety standards. Additionally, there 
is no control on the cobalt that is mined illicitly, or that has caused human rights 
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violations, whether artisanal or industrially. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights set out the responsibility for the transnational companies to comply with 
international human rights law throughout the whole supply chain. Nevertheless, in the 
cobalt supply chain, the private sector is currently failing to carry out the human rights 
due diligence in the cobalt supply chain. Adequate systems to monitor and enforce the 
labour standards that exists are widely unavailable in the DRC and the private sector often 
is unable to carry out the guidelines they are supposed to (Amnesty International, 2017, 
p.9). Besides, if it comes to the home states, where the transnational companies are 
registered and have their headquarters, currently no state legally requires the companies 
to report on their cobalt supply chains. As we witness a clear absence of regulated due 
diligence standards, the companies only fail to comply with the guiding principles.  
Transnational companies often struggle to apply efforts to address social, economic 
and environmental risks and impacts to the extraction of non-renewable resources 
(Eggart, 2015, p.5). Some leading companies in the cobalt supply chain drive the industry 
initiative toward regulated due diligence standards to clean the supply chain. These 
companies are voluntary moving to treat cobalt supplies in the same category as conflict 
minerals (e.g. Apple Inc., 2018, p.1). This industry-led reclassification created a domino 
effect and more and more companies throughout the whole supply chain are intensifying 
their due diligence activities in line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines (RCS, 
2018, p.2). Herewith making the cobalt supply chain more responsible. This move makes 
sense from both a human rights perspective and from a business perspective. For the 
latter, transnational certification schemes and due diligence schemes are decreasing 
business risks. Regarding (artisanal) cobalt mining, transnational companies are exposed 
to reputational, legal and compliance, operational and commercial risks (RCS, 2018, p.4). 
Reputational risks are feared when child labour, human rights abuses, corruption and 
other illegal activities develop into public relations incidents. Legal and compliance risks 
occur when the companies fail to meet relevant requirements and if its risk exposure is 
not mitigated to regulatory standards. One infamous example can be found in the Anvil 
Mining lawsuit when Anvil Mining, operating a mining site in the copper cobalt belt, 
provided transportation to the Congolese Armed Forces during a short occupation by 
rebels (CCIJ, 2018, p.1). Operational risks are the result of unsafe working conditions 
and problems to health and safety, which undermine operational efficiency. Commercial 
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risks occur as the problems complicate the sale of cobalt, making the trade more 
expensive and less secure (RCS, 2018, p.4).  
The majority of the transnational initiatives introduced in the DRC are indeed 
concentrated in subsectors with high business risks and human risks. In near-history, the 
DRC introduced multiple transnational initiatives where multinational companies and 
NGOs had influence in the global governance process. In 2003, the government signed 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) adopted by the UN General 
Assembly (Mazalto, 2009, p.222). Since ratification, the KPSC legally binds its member 
states to prevent conflict diamonds that potentially fund conflict from entering the 
markets (Santiago, 2015, p.413). The DRC subsequently joined the multi-stakeholder 
Diamond Development Initiative emerged, to “strengthen the developmental impacts 
associated with artisanal diamond mining” (Sarkar, 2009, p.79). Successively, it joined 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, with the objective of promoting greater 
traceability of mining revenues, intended to promote the productivity of artisanal miners 
and to ensure development of the mining sites (DRC in Mazalto, 2009, p.222). In general, 
more and more developing states possessing non-renewable minerals resort to 
certification schemes and mechanisms based on transnational governance processes. 
According to Mazalto (2009), it appears to be an interesting solution to the increasing 
challenges in the mining industry (p.222).  
 It indeed could be an interesting solution to make the cobalt supply chain more 
responsible. Although the transnational companies are charged with the burden of tracing 
the cobalt, a major human rights and business interest counterbalance economic costs. 
The tracing mechanisms that clean up the cobalt supply chain decreases the identified 
business risks. Rather than ineffective national laws from the DRC, legislators should 
empower and legitimize companies that currently trade cobalt ethically (De Koninck, 
2015, p.141). Besides, the inclusion of NGOs and civil society in the reforming process 
could be beneficial as well. As we have seen with the Dodd-Frank Act, neither Congress 
in drafting Section 1502 nor SEC in its rulemaking process for Section 1502 consulted 
with Congolese authorities, mining labourers or the private sector (De Konink, 2015, 
p.142). Subsequently, problems have risen that could have been avoided by transnational 
governance processes. De Koninck (2015) notes “NGOs, civil society, corporations and 
the Congolese government should join forces to develop a comprehensive certification 
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process that authenticates minerals and legitimizes their mining origins”. He continues, 
“such certification would end the tragedy of the commons in the Congo because mining 
practices would be legitimized and regulated” (p.147).  
NGOs, civil society, corporations and the Congolese government could legitimize 
and regulate the cobalt mining sector cooperatively. For the transnational companies, 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) plays a major role herein. In recent years, CSR 
has implications for conflict and risk mitigation strategies in conflict-prone or fragile 
states. It contributes to security and human rights policy and practice while it reduces the 
negative externalities. As many governments do not have the capacity to perform 
monitoring roles or do not possess the political will to perform such functions, public-
private partnerships are a common CSR approach (Perks, 2011, p.251). Corporate self-
regulation is often based on voluntary codes and guidelines. However, this self-regulation 
currently fails to implement uniform standards for all companies, with headquarters in all 
states, in the cobalt supply chain. Besides, it has no accompanying enforcement 
mechanism. By transnational governance, all stakeholders work more closely to achieve 
common goals and create regulation for the whole supply chain (Perks, 2011, p.252) 
Concluding, transnational governance initiatives could be an interesting solution for 
the challenges to cobalt extraction from the DRC, as identified in the sub questions. When 
NGOs, civil society, transnational corporations and the Congolese government cooperate 
in regulating the cobalt mining industry mutual benefit is created. As current transnational 
initiatives are often voluntary, the transnational corporations do not legally have to 
comply with due diligence schemes. However, we note that most new initiatives are 
industry-led. Instead of putting an artisanal cobalt mine embargo in place, attempts to 
regulate cobalt from the mining sites, in the same way as conflict minerals like tin and 
coltan from Eastern Congo could serve to make good contribution to both the artisanal 
miners and regional economy (Wilson, 2018, p.1).    
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6. Conclusion 
Greater international interest in the resource dimension of conflicts, the increasing 
demand resulting of low-carbon technologies, increased sensitivity to criticism on the part 
of transnational companies and industry-led initiatives may provide a long-awaited 
opportunity to regulate the utilization of critical raw materials originating in conflict-
prone states. We have shown the shortcoming of current regulatory approaches to the 
exploitation of critical raw materials originating in conflict-prone states. As such, within 
the single-case study of cobalt extraction from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
we illustrated the need for transnational resource control in the utilization of critical raw 
materials.  
The role of the private sector in the exploitation of critical raw materials and the 
continuation of the conflict has been vital. The wealth of the DRC remains attractive and 
in the context of lawlessness and the weakness of central authority. This failure to regulate 
energy is more present in fragile or conflict-prone states. While national governments fail 
to regulate energy in key international aspects, transnational governance mechanism 
could mutually benefit all stakeholders. Herein, the private sector plays a key role in the 
establishment of rules and regulations by which they themselves are governed as well. 
Fragility, as measured in the effectiveness, authority and legitimacy of a state, is directly 
related to capacity deficits. We note the same capacity deficits in the DRC. Throughout 
history, wars have been fought on its territory over the control of the natural resources it 
possesses. While the conflict minerals in the east of the country have been regulated, we 
have shown the absence of regulations in the cobalt mining industry.  
General barriers to the utilization of critical raw materials include an imbalance 
between demand and supply, uneven geographical distribution, the paradox of increased 
energy consumption as a result of the mining activities, the environmental and social 
impacts and the lack of data and the problems with data collection. These theoretical 
barriers all apply to our case study as well. More specifically, we see two parallel sectors 
in the mining industry of the DRC, both having additional barriers. The artisanal mining 
sector faces widespread human rights violations, health risks and societal and 
environmental risks. The cobalt mined artisanal flows, often illicitly, into the formal 
cobalt supply chain. The formal cobalt sector is unable to trace the legality of the cobalt 
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ores due to widespread corruption. Downstream companies fear a shortage of cobalt and 
negotiate long-term contracts with the upstream companies. At the same time, these 
upstream companies face insecure national legislation troubling their activities.  
 The DRC currently fails to comply with multiple international and regional treaties. 
Many of the cobalt mining zones, whether artisanal or formal, are exploited without any 
control over the labour conditions, job safety standards and human rights. While the 
government faces capacity deficits, we notice a trend where private sector initiatives 
voluntary regulate due diligence standards in the natural resource extraction industry. The 
transnational companies are exposed to reputational, legal and compliance, operational 
and commercial risks. To reduce the business risks, multiple transnational initiatives have 
been introduced in the DRC. This could be an interesting solution to make the cobalt 
supply chain more responsible as well. NGOs, civil society, transnational corporations 
and the Congolese government could legitimize and regulate the cobalt mining sector 
cooperatively.  
 We have demonstrated the need for transnational resource control in utilizing cobalt 
from the DRC. As the cobalt industry of the DRC is an extreme case, we expect similar 
theoretical benefits in the utilization of other critical raw materials from other conflict-
prone states. This claim is supported by the transnational regulatory approaches 
legitimizing the extraction of other non-renewable resources and conflict minerals. 
However, similar future scenarios should be tested individually to be completely sure of 
the findings within this research. We would encourage other scholars to contribute to the 
academic literature on cobalt mining and cobalt supply risks. Besides, we invite other 
scholars to conduct similar research when similar barriers to the utilization of a particular 
critical raw material occur.  
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